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We study an elementary two-player card game where in each round players compare cards and
the holder of the smallest card wins. Using the rate equations approach, we treat the stochastic
version of the game in which cards are drawn randomly. We obtain an exact solution for arbitrary
initial conditions. In general, the game approaches a steady state where the card densities of the
two players are proportional to each other. The leading small size behavior of the initial card
densities determines the corresponding proportionality constant, while the next correction governs
the asymptotic time dependence. The relaxation towards the steady state exhibits a rich behavior,
e.g., it may be algebraically slow or exponentially fast. Moreover, in ruin situations where one player
eventually wins all cards, the game may even end in a finite time.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Ey, 05.40.-a, 51.10.+y, 89.65.-s
Numerous phenomena in social and economic sciences
involve multiple interacting agents. The interaction be-
tween these agents often leads to exchange of quanti-
ties such as capital, goods, political opinions, etc. [1–5].
Games are widely employed in modelling collective be-
havior especially in the context of economics [6], with
recent examples ranging from evolution of trading strate-
gies in a stock market [7–9] to bidding in auctions [10].
Games can often be regarded as many body exchange
processes resembling collision processes [11], and there-
fore their dynamics may be described by suitably adapted
kinetic theories [12]. Here, we investigate a stochastic
null strategy card game. By considering the “thermody-
namic limit” where the initial number of cards is infinite,
we show that rate equations provide a natural framework
for analyzing game dynamics.
Our two-player game is defined as follows. Each player
starts with a certain number of cards. At each round
players draw a card randomly from their deck and com-
pare the card values. The player with the smaller card
wins the round and gets both cards. This is repeated
ad infinitum or until one of the players gains all cards.
This stochastic adaptation of the elementary card game
“war” is also motivated by a recently introduced auction
bidding model where the lowest bid is rewarded [10].
Our main result is that one specific aspect of the ini-
tial card distribution, namely, the small size tail, gov-
erns the dynamics of the game. Let us denote by A
and B the two players, and let their initial card den-
sities be a0(x) and b0(x), respectively. In the long time
limit, a steady state is approached with the card den-
sities of both players being equal to a fraction of the
total card density, a∞(x) = α[a0(x)+ b0(x)], with a∞(x)
the limiting card density of player A. While a family
of steady state solutions characterized by the parameter
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is in principle possible, the leading small size
behavior of the initial distributions selects a specific value
α = limx→0
a0(x)
a0(x)+b0(x)
. Moreover, the next leading cor-
rection determines how the system approaches the steady
state. The corresponding time dependent behavior may
be algebraic or exponential. Interesting behaviors also
occur when one player captures all cards. In this case,
the game duration maybe finite or infinite. Additionally,
using numerical simulations we show that the theoreti-
cal predictions concerning the game duration extend to
deterministic realizations of the game.
Let the initial number of cards of player A and B be
NA and NB, respectively, and let the total number be
N = NA +NB. We shall take the thermodynamic limit
NA, NB, N → ∞ such that the initial fractions NA/N
andNB/N are fixed. Then the card exchange process can
be conveniently described via rate equations for a(x, t)
and b(x, t), the densities of cards with value x at time t
for players A and B, respectively. These densities evolve
according to the nonlinear integro-differential equations
∂
∂t
a(x, t) = R(x, t),
∂
∂t
b(x, t) = −R(x, t), (1)
with the gain (loss) term R(x, t) given by
R =
1
A(t)B(t)
[
b(x, t)
∫ x
0
dy a(y, t)− a(x, t)
∫ x
0
dy b(y, t)
]
.
Here
A(t) =
∫
∞
0
dx a(x, t), B(t) =
∫
∞
0
dx b(x, t) (2)
are the fraction of cards possessed by players A and B,
respectively. Clearly,
A(t) +B(t) = 1. (3)
The rate equations (1) reflect the nature of the game as
the rate by which player A gains (loses) cards of value x is
proportional to the fraction of his opponent’s cards which
is larger (smaller) than x. The overall factor [AB]−1 en-
sures that on average, every opposing pair of cards comes
into play once per unit time. The minimal card value was
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tacitly set to zero as the process is invariant under the
transformation x→ x+ const.
Besides the obvious conservation law (3), two other
conservation laws underly the process. First, the total
number of cards of a given value is conserved,
a(x, t) + b(x, t) = u0(x), (4)
where u0(x) = a0(x) + b0(x) is the initial total density.
Second, the density of the minimal card remains con-
stant throughout the evolution: a(0, t) = a0(0), where
a0(x) ≡ a(x, t = 0), and similarly for B.
The steady state behavior is quite generic. The cumu-
lative card densities, A(x, t) =
∫ x
0 dy a(y, t) and B(x, t) =∫ x
0
dy b(y, t), satisfy A′/A = B′/B in the long time limit.
Thus, A∞(x) ∝ B∞(x), and consequently, the limiting
card densities, a∞(x) = A
′
∞
(x) and b∞(x) = B
′
∞
(x),
are proportional to each other. The conservation law (4)
implies that each of the limiting card densities equals a
fraction of the overall card density
a∞(x) = αu0(x), b∞(x) = (1− α)u0(x). (5)
In principle, for a given total card density u0(x), there
is a family of steady state solutions characterized by
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Moreover, initial conditions where the densi-
ties are proportional to each other do not evolve further
in time regardless of α. Still, for a given initial condition
a specific value of α is selected. This value can easily be
found for a class of initial conditions with non-vanishing
minimal card densities, u0(0) > 0. Consider the den-
sity of the smallest cards x = 0. Equation (5) gives
a∞(0) = αu0(0), while the second conservation law im-
plies a∞(0) = a0(0), and hence α = a0(0)/[a0(0)+b0(0)].
This simple argument suggests that the smallest cards
govern the outcome of the game. In the following, we
solve for the full time dependent behavior and show that
in general, the limiting small size tail of the two distri-
butions dictates α.
To solve the time dependent behavior, we make two
simplifying transformations. First, the overall rate by
which the exchange occurs [AB]−1 can be absorbed into
a modified time variable τ , defined via
τ =
∫ t
0
ds [A(s)B(s)]
−1
. (6)
The second transformation essentially reduces any total
density u0(x) to a uniform density by introducing the
variable ξ
ξ =
∫ x
0
dy u0(y). (7)
Suppressing the explicit time dependence, the trans-
formed card densities are found from the relations
a¯(ξ) dξ = a(x) dx and b¯(ξ) dξ = b(x) dx. Clearly, these
satisfy a¯(ξ) = a(x)/u0(x) and b¯(ξ) = b(x)/u0(x). In the
following, we shall omit the bar. The conservation law
(4) becomes
a(ξ, τ) + b(ξ, τ) = 1, (8)
i.e., the transformed total density is uniform on the in-
terval [0,1] (note that Eqs. (3) and (7) imply 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1).
The above transformations simplify the evolution
equations, and given the linear dependence (8), it suf-
fices to solve for a
∂
∂τ
a(ξ, τ) = b(ξ, τ)
∫ ξ
0
dη a(η, τ)− a(ξ, τ)
∫ ξ
0
dη b(η, τ).
Replacing b(ξ, τ) with 1 − a(ξ, τ) linearizes this equa-
tion ∂
∂τ
a(ξ, τ) =
∫ ξ
0 dη a(η, τ) − ξa(ξ, τ), and differentiat-
ing with respect to ξ yields further simplification
(
∂
∂τ
+ ξ
)
∂
∂ξ
a(ξ, τ) = 0. (9)
Integrating over τ and then over ξ we arrive at our pri-
mary result, the exact time dependent solution for arbi-
trary initial conditions:
a(ξ, τ) = α+
∫ ξ
0
dη a′0(η) e
−ητ . (10)
Hereinafter we utilize the notations a0(ξ) ≡ a(ξ, τ = 0),
a′0(ξ) ≡
d
dξ
a0(ξ), and α = a0(ξ = 0).
Let us again consider the steady state. In the long time
limit τ → ∞, the integral in (10) vanishes and the den-
sities become uniform a(ξ, τ) → α and b(ξ, τ) → 1 − α.
Hence in terms of the original variable x, both densi-
ties are proportional to u0(x) according to Eq. (5), with
α = a0(ξ = 0) = a0(x = 0)/u0(x = 0). Even when
u0(x) vanishes or diverges as x → 0, the parameter α is
well-defined and using l’Hopital rule, it is given by
α = lim
x→0
a0(x)
a0(x) + b0(x)
. (11)
Thus, if the two distributions exhibit different leading
behaviors, say limx→0 b0(x)/a0(x) = 0, then player A
eventually ruins player B. Hence, the small card tail
x → 0 provides the necessary selection criteria deter-
mining which of the family of solutions (5) is eventually
selected by the dynamics.
We now study the approach to the steady state. For
example, the density A(τ) =
∫ 1
0 dξ a(ξ, τ) is given by
A(τ) = α+
∫ 1
0
dξ (1− ξ) a′0(ξ) e
−ξτ . (12)
While the steady state behavior is determined by the
leading small argument behavior of a0(ξ), the relaxation
towards the final state is governed by the correction to
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the leading behavior. Let us consider the following small
argument behavior
a0(ξ) ≃ α+ γξ
δ ξ → 0, (13)
with δ > 0. Then, one has A(τ) − α ≃ γΓ(δ + 1)τ−δ.
However, in terms of the actual time variable t, a richer
variety of behaviors is exhibited.
First, suppose that the system approaches an active
steady state, i.e., 0 < α < 1. Then from Eq. (6) we
obtain t→ α(1 − α)τ , and therefore
A(t)− α ≃ Ct−δ, t→∞ (14)
with C = γΓ(δ + 1)[α(1 − α)]δ. Hence, the approach is
generally algebraic.
Next, suppose that one player, say A, eventually ruins
their opponent, i.e., α = 1. Then dt/dτ ∼ B(τ) ∼ τ−δ
and consequently, t ∼ τ1−δ. Therefore, for δ ≤ 1 rep-
resenting weak initial advantage of the eventual winner,
the game duration is infinite:
1−A(t) ∼
{
t−
δ
1−δ δ < 1;
e−const×t δ = 1.
(15)
In the complementary situation of strong initial advan-
tage for the eventual winner, δ > 1, the game duration is
finite:
A(tf ) = 1. (16)
The terminal time can be determined from the integral
tf =
∫
∞
0 dτA(τ) [1−A(τ)]. Using Eq. (12) and recalling
that α = 1 yields this time as an explicit function of the
initial conditions
tf = −
∫ 1
0
dξ
1− ξ
ξ
a′0(ξ) (17)
−
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
dξ1 dξ2
(1− ξ1)(1− ξ2)
ξ1 + ξ2
a′0(ξ1) a
′
0(ξ2).
For example, the initial density a0(ξ) = 1 − ξ
2 yields
tf =
2
15 +
16
15 ln 2 ≈ 0.87269. Additionally, the time de-
pendent approach towards the final state is algebraic,
1−A(t) ∼ (tf − t)
δ
δ−1 , (18)
sufficiently close to the terminal time t → tf . As ex-
pected, the density decreases linearly with time when the
disparity between the two players becomes very large in
the limit δ →∞.
Thus if the system approaches a trivial steady state
with one player winning all cards, the temporal behavior
can be algebraically slow or exponentially fast. Moreover,
every positive power can be realized. Remarkably, if the
initial disparity between the two players is sufficiently
large, the game ends in a finite time. Interestingly, such
disparity is expressed only in terms of the density of the
smallest cards, with the larger cards practically irrelevant
to the game outcome.
Next, we analyze the time dependent evolution of the
entire card density, not simply the overall number den-
sity. Evaluating the leading behavior of the density (10)
in the long time limit, we find that the density exhibits
a boundary layer structure
a(ξ, τ) − α ≃
{
γξδ ξ ≪ τ−1;
γΓ(δ + 1)τ−δ ξ ≫ τ−1.
(19)
The scale ξ0 ∼ τ
−1 underlies the distribution. Cards
larger than this scale have already relaxed to the limit-
ing distribution, while cards smaller than this scale have
yet to exchange hands and hence, are still dominated by
the initial distribution. In other words, smaller cards are
slower to equilibrate, consistent with the fact that the
small size tail dominates the asymptotic behavior.
We now briefly discuss the case where the number of
card flavors is finite, or in other words, discrete card dis-
tributions
a(x, t) =
k∑
n=1
an(t)δ(x − xn), (20)
b(x, t) =
k∑
n=1
bn(t)δ(x − xn),
with x1 = 0 and xn < xn+1. The discrete version of the
rate equations can be written and solved directly using
a series of transformation which mimics the ones used
above. Instead, we shall insert the initial conditions (20)
in the general continuous case solution (10).
Denote again un(t) = un(0) = an(0) + bn(0) the to-
tal card concentration. The variable ξn =
∑n−1
m=1 um(0)
plays the role of ξ and the time variable τ remains as in
Eq. (6). The solution (10) reads
an(τ)
un(0)
=
a1(0)
u1(0)
+
n∑
m=2
(
am(0)
um(0)
−
am−1(0)
um−1(0)
)
e−ξmτ . (21)
Since all terms in the summation eventually vanish, the
two players approach a limiting distribution which is pro-
portional to the initial distribution an(∞) = αun(0) with
α = a1(0)/u1(0), in accordance with Eq. (11). In gen-
eral, the approach to the steady state is exponential. We
first discuss the case 0 < α < 1. Since A∞ = α, one
has t→ α(1− α)τ asymptotically. Hence, the relaxation
towards the steady state is exponential
A(t)− α ∼ e−const×t. (22)
In the complementary case when one player wins all
cards, α = 1, the approach is dominated by the first non-
vanishing term in the summation, namely, the first non-
vanishing bn(0). In this case, dt/dτ ∝ exp(−const × τ),
and consequently, the game duration is finite as in
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Eq. (16). In summary, the behavior in the discrete case
is different from the continuous case in that the time de-
pendent behavior is generally exponential. An additional
difference is that when one player captures all cards, the
game duration is always finite.
In the above, we discussed games with an infinite num-
ber of cards. Nevertheless, one can apply the above re-
sults to realistic situations when both players start with
a finite number, sayN , cards. We note that the time unit
used above is of the order N2 rounds in an actual game.
For the case δ > 1 one therefore predicts a duration
Tf ∼ N
2, (23)
with Tf the number of rounds. The duration in the
marginal δ = 1 case can be estimated using the aver-
age time it takes for player B to get down to one card
B(t) = N−1. Utilizing the exponential decay of B(t), we
find that there is an additional logarithmic dependence,
Tf ∼ N
2 lnN , in this case.
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FIG. 1. Duration of the game as a function of the number
of cards. Shown is Tf the number of rounds a game lasts on
average versus N , the initial number of cards. The results
represent an average over 104 realizations. A line of slope 2
is plotted for reference.
Monte Carlo simulations are consistent with these pre-
dictions. In the simulations, each player starts with N
cards drawn from a uniform distribution in the range
0 < x < 1. Eventually, the player holding the smallest
card wins. Our theory describes the stochastic realization
of the game where cards are drawn randomly from the
deck. We also examined the deterministic case where the
card order is fixed throughout the game. In this version,
the winner of a round places both cards in the bottom
of the deck. In both cases, we find diffusive terminal
times as in Eq. (23). Nevertheless, the two cases differ
with the stochastic game ending faster than the deter-
ministic one (see Fig. 1). Additionally, we find that this
diffusive time scale characterizes the entire distribution
of terminal times, as fluctuations in the terminal time are
proportional to the mean 〈T 2f 〉 − 〈Tf 〉
2 ∝ 〈Tf 〉
2.
In closing, we studied a stochastic two-player card
game using the rate equations approach. We found that
extremal characteristics of the initial conditions select a
particular steady state out of a family of possible solu-
tions. Eventually, the card densities of the players be-
come proportional to each other. However, the players
generally possess different overall number of cards and it
is even possible that one player gains all cards. The ap-
proach towards the steady state exhibits rich behavior.
Large cards tend to equilibrate faster than small cards,
and the distribution develops a boundary layer structure.
The time dependent behavior of the overall density is al-
gebraic in cases where a steady state is approached. In
the complementary case where one player gains all cards,
the game may end in a finite or an infinite time. The rela-
tive initial advantage of the winner, characterized by the
correction to the leading extremal behavior, determines
the game duration in this case.
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